NEXUS BETWEEN ISLAM AND MODERN (SECULAR) STATE: EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIAN COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL ERA

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Abstract: *Many studies have revealed that Muslims hold diverse views about the relationship between Islam and the modern ('secular') state, but few of them have attempted to investigate on Muslims' cultural capital and its impact to their view. This article explores on the variety and dynamic of Muslims' cultural capital and its influence on their views concerning the issue of Islam-state relationship in colonial and post-colonial Indonesia (the Old Order and the New Order era). Particular attention is given to santri ('devout' Muslims) and abangan (nominal and syncretic Muslims), their cultural capital, their formation to be Islamist and secularist Muslims, and their shifting in changing political contexts. This article argues that the political context in colonial period had shaped different cultural capital of santri and aristocraticabangan and contributed in shaping the former to be Islamist and the latter to be secularist. Nevertheless, the repressive policy of the Old Order and the New Order government towards Islamist movements encouraged new generations of santri affiliating with revivalist and Islamist groups to re-conceptualize the relationship between Islam and the state. The social and political context had shaped new cultural capital of these new generations supporting them in dealing with the situation.*

Keywords: *Islam and state; santri and abangan; Islamist; secularist; cultural capital*

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between Islam and the modern postcolonial 'secular' state has produced heated debate in many Muslim-majority countries, including Indonesia, Egypt, Turkey, Syria, and Pakistan (Mandaville 2007, 49–51). Most Islamic leaders in those countries, especially those holding Islamism's views, want Islam to be at the foundation of their states – to be the source of state law of their political and economic systems. On the other hand, secularists in these countries want their states to be based on a more or less indigenised version of western modernity, comprising nationalism, socialism or capitalism, which have usually sought to separate religion and the state, with a 'neutral' religious influence on the public sphere (Mandaville 2007; Fox 2008; 2012). Consequently, while each general approach summaries a

range of positions, secularists have typically been in conflict with Islamists on this issue.

Although many studies have shown that Muslims hold diverse views about the relationships between Islam and the state, few of them have attempted to explore on the dynamic of Muslims' cultural capital and its impact to theirview. Therefore, this article investigates on the variety and expansion of Muslims' cultural capital and its influence on their views and attitude towards the issue of Islam-state relationship in colonial and post-colonial Indonesia. This study limited the investigation of post-colonial context only on the Old Order regime (ruled 1945-1966) and the New Order government (ruled 1966-1998).

Particular attention is given to santri('devout' Muslims) and abangan(nominal and syncretic Muslims), their cultural capital,and their transformation to be Islamist (contemporary Islamic revivalist) and secularist Muslims as well as their shift in changing social and political contexts. I argue that the political context in colonial period hadshaped different cultural capital of santri and aristocraticabangan and contributed in forming the former to be the proponent of the Islamization of the state, while the latter to be the opponent. However, the repressive attitude towardsIslamist movements that the Old Order government took during the 1960s and the New Order took between 1966 and the 1980s encouraged new generations affiliating with revivalist and Islamist groups to re-conceptualize the relationship between Islam and the state. This social and political context had shaped new cultural capital of these new generations supporting them in dealing with the situation. These new generations campaigned for a newmodernist form of Islam, or so-called neo-modernism, to legitimize the secular nature of the modern state.

1.1. Santri, abangan and their cultural capital

Although there are indications that people within the Indonesian archipelago[1] had converted to Islam before the 10th Century CE, a significant number of Muslims did not emerge in the archipelago until the 13th Century(Ricklefs 2001, 3-4), when the first Islamic kingdom, the SamuderaPasai, was established (Ricklefs 2001). The Sultanate of SamuderaPasai existed from the 13th through to the 16th Century (Ricklefs 2001; Drakeley 2005; Lambourn 2004; Crow 2000). This kingdom was located in North Sumatera, in the coastal area of Aceh.

Indonesian people encountered Islam through international trading with Muslim traders from China and India, and especially with Arabs since the early periods of Islamic history (the 7th Century) (Drakeley 2005). These

'foreign' Muslim traders came to and remained in Indonesia for periods of time before returning to their home countries. They contributed in the process of converting Indonesian people living in coastal areas – important sites for international trading at the time – to Islam (Ricklefs 2001). Initially, the process of conversion took place via marriages between 'foreign' Muslims and indigenous people. Furthermore, these traders often acted as preachers, as most Muslims believed that they were obliged to preach Islam to non-Muslims, and thus significant numbers of indigenous people began to convert to Islam. This factor could explain why the earliest Islamic kingdoms – such as the SamuderaPasai, Aceh,[2] and Demak[3] – emerged in coastal areas, whilst theinterior regions of Indonesia were still dominated by Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms, especially Java.

The establishment of the Islamic Mataram Sultanate in Java in the 17th Century marked the shift in Islamic political power from the coastal locations to the inner areas of Indonesia (Ricklefs 2007, 3). In this period, most Javanese people living in these inner regions held on to deeply-rooted Javanese beliefs that were strongly influenced by Hinduism and Buddhism (Carey 2007; Ricklefs 2007). Given that these religions (Hinduism and Buddhism) had been part of Indonesian worldviews since the 1st Century, it was no surprise that they had penetrated the Javanese faith substantially. In other words, Javanese beliefs in this period (17th Century) were accumulation of their culture that had been existing in the society since several centuries before. This is what I call cultural capital in this article.

By cultural capital I mean sources or symbolic assets such as culture, beliefs, skills, norms, knowledge, and views accumulated through experience, family, neighbourhood, society, environment, and education. This does not mean that the cultural capital is inherited automatically. It is internalized by long process of interaction, understanding and learning. The term of cultural capital was introduced by the French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu (1986). Bourdieu defines cultural capital as the resources accumulated and/or transformed through heritage and education which shape people's capacities and orientations (see Bourdieu 1986; Moore 2008, 101-118). As a result, although the Mataram kingdom was officially Islamic at this time, local Javanese beliefs and rituals[4] still dominated the character and behaviour of the sultanate.

This was the reason why since the beginning of the Mataram sultanate system, sultans had attempted to negotiate Islam with Javanese beliefs. Sultan Agung (ruled 1613–1645), for instance, combined the Islamic and Javanese

calendars into a new hybrid. This type of approach to their unification was continued by his successors, especially by Sultan Pakubuwana II (ruled 1726–1742) (Ricklefs 2006; 2007). Therefore, the sultans played a significant role in creating a particular character of Javanese or indigenous Islam, and this kind of Islam enabled people in Java in particular to feel more accommodating towards Islam by removing the dilemma of choosing between being Muslim or being Javanese. On the one hand, they embraced Islam as their religion, whilst on the other they retained Javanese faiths, such as believing in RatuKidul – the local Goddess of the Southern Ocean (Ricklefs 2006).

The rising awareness about Islamic identity that was seen among hajis (label of Muslims who have performed religious pilgrimage so called hajj in Mecca, Saudi Arabia) by the middle of the 19th Century interrupted this 'psychological acceptance' of a hybrid position by Javanese people. Although there had been found pilgrimage activity around the 17th Century as shown from Indonesian ulama networks (see Azra 2004),the 19th Century was a time at which the number of Indonesian pilgrims increased significantly (Laffan 2003; Ricklefs 2007) as a result of improvements in infrastructure brought about by the opening of the Suez Canal, the role of travel agents, and the large steamships provided by the Dutch colonial government that enabled Indonesian Muslims to perform their pilgrimage much more easily (Laffan 2003; Hurgronje 2007). Thousands of people began to travel to Mecca every year, and most of them stayed more than one year, either for economic reasons or for study (Hurgronje 2007). The majority of these Indonesian pilgrims were merchants, in addition to some children from aristocratic families (Hurgronje 2007). It can be concluded that this early modern form of pilgrimage to Mecca was an Indonesian middle-class phenomenon.

There were at least three reasons for Indonesian Muslims to go to Mecca – to perform hajj, to trade, and to study Islamic sciences (Hurgronje 2007, 237). Most of the Indonesian pilgrims who went to study Islamic disciplines stayed at the Java colony, in which many students of archipelago origin (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, and Thailand) lived. This colony was like a boarding house for the students, and they studied under 'ulama – a position that had been officially created by Shaikh al-Islam (an official leader of 'ulama) of Mecca, mainly as a result of interpreting the teachings of the Qur'an, Hadith, and Fiqh.

After their return to Indonesia, both those who just gone to perform hajj and those who had studied for several years in Mecca and Medina tended to

have strengthened Islamic identities, dressing like Arabic people (Hurgronje 2007, 258–259). This means that their experiences during the pilgrimage in those 'sacred cities' had expanded their cultural capital which was different with the mainstream (lower class and most aristocrats) of Javanese Muslim society. They perceived what they had observed in Haramayn (Mecca and Medina) to be the 'true Islam', and some of them attempted to bring Muslims more into line with this 'true Islam,' which polarized Muslim societies to become loyal to either their Islamic identity or their local identity, while some of them aimed to significantly 'purify' Muslims' beliefs and practices.

Javanese Muslims who performed pilgrimages to Mecca were alerted that the syncretic Islam performed by the Mataram rulers and people was different to the 'true Islam' that they saw in Mecca (Ricklefs 2007; Hurgronje 2007). In other words, these hajis were influenced by revivalist ideas requiring Muslim rituals to be in line with the Qur'an and the Sunna. Soon after their return, they sought to correct other Muslims' beliefs and practices to follow the 'true Islam'. As a result, many Javanese people – both from the elite and the lower classes – responded negatively to them. This revivalist movement thus generated a boundary between Muslims who were committed to 'true Islam' and those who were still loyal to 'Javanese Islam' (Ricklefs 2007). It is worth highlighting here that the fans of revivalist Islam and the Javanese Islam have different cultural capital. This different cultural capital produced different orientation and priority among the Javanese in terms of the relationship between Islamic identity and Javanese identity.

This was the time at which the identities of abangan (nominal and syncretic Muslims) and santri[5] ('devout' Muslims) appeared (Ricklefs 2007, 84–104). Clifford Geertz invented this typology as a result of fieldwork he conducted in Java in the 1950s, but Geertz did not focus on the origin of abangan and santri, as Ricklefs did. Thus I will rely more on Ricklefs' work here. Geertz (1960) categorized Muslims in Java into three types: santri, abangan, and priyayi (an aristocratic class of Javanese society). According to Geertz (1960), most santri came from the middle classes, abangan from the lower classes, and priyayi from the upper classes. Both abangan and priyayi were Muslims but, as Geertz (1960) explained, abangan did not observe Islamic rituals such as five-time daily prayers, while priyayi were more proud of their Javanese identities.

I disagree with the way in which Geertz categorizes priyayi together with santri and abangan. My critique follows Koentjaraningrat (1963; 1989) and Kim (1996) by arguing that the priyayi (aristocrat) social class is different in

nature from the two categories of Muslims, which are related to religious character, and hence it is not appropriate to compare them. I prefer to divide the abangan classification in two: 1) lower class abangan and 2) aristocratic abangan. As Ricklefs (2007) explains,the word 'abangan' comes from the Javanese language, and means 'red'. The word was often contrasted with 'white', with white signifying kindness, trueness, obedience, and niceness, and red marking badness, cruelty, rebellion, and disobedience (Ricklefs 2007, 84–104). This indicates that abangan was a loaded term that revivalistsapplied to define those who, according to their critique, did not take the 'right path'.

The term abangan refers not only to lower classes, as Geertz suggest, but also to priyayi (aristocrat) as most priyayi at that time did not conduct Islamic rituals like santri did, and were more committed to their Javanese identities (see Geertz 1960). In addition, there were many priyayi that did not like santri movements at this time (see Ricklefs 2007).[6] Most priyayi preferred to replace their Javanese beliefs with Western modernity (secularism) than with 'true Islam' (Islamic revivalism) (see Latif 2008). This was clearly shown when the colonial government offered the aristocratsthe chance to study in Dutch schools and work in the colonial administration during the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries – a policy based on their political ideology of using the aristocrats as the main agents for modernizing Indonesia (Benda 1958, 344). Thus there is good evidence that the syncretic character of Islam that developed in the inner areas – which was supported by both members of the lower class and the aristocracy – versus the rising agenda of the Muslims who had just returned from pilgrimages to purify Islam from syncretism led to a polarization of Muslims as santri and abangan.Santri represented middle class Muslims, whereas abangan represented mostly lower and aristocratic Muslims.

2. INDONESIAN MUSLIMS, MODERNITY, AND THEIR CULTURAL CAPITAL

Indonesian Muslims (santri and abangan) in the colonial era interacted with Western modernity via two different means; while santri was through Islamic modernist thinkers in Egypt,aristocratic abanganthrough Western educations – either undertaken in Indonesia through the schools established by the Dutch government or in the Netherlands. Given that the colonial government's policy restricted educations to the aristocracy, most santri – who were middle class Muslims, particularly its elites – studied modernity using Islamic modernist thinkers in Cairo, especially through Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida's (1865–1935) writings. This means that most santri had particular

cultural capital which was different with non-santri, particularly aristocratic abangan. These santris' basic educations were undertaken in pesantren or Islamic schools (madrasas), and they learned a form of Western modernity that had been blended with Islamic teachings (Latif 2008). In other words, they learned Islamic modernism through Islamic modernist scholars. This cultural capital–theireducational backgrounds and their learning using Islamic modernist thinkers – affected the extent to which the santri (within their respective organizations) responded to issues relating to Islam and modernity in Indonesia. They were caught between the modernism of Abduh – whowas regarded as a liberal Muslim thinker – andthe revivalism of Rida, with most tending to adopt a revivalist or Islamist rather than a modernist orientation. In Indonesia this tendency during the colonial period was also known as 'kaummuda' (young group). They were contrasted with 'kaumtua' (old group) whose basis was in traditional pesantren (traditional Islamic boarding schools) and conservative Islam (see Abdullah 1971; Saleh 2001). These terms derived from West Sumatera during the 20th Century where a puritan group called kaummuda attempted to purify Islam from local beliefs and traditions that were assumed not to be in accordance with Islam.

Most of these Muslims (santri) became activists in key Islamic organizations such as the 1) Jam'iyyatKhair, 2) Muhammadiyah, 3) Sarekat Islam (SI), and 4) Persatuan Islam (Persis). I will say a little more about each now. 1) Jam'iyyatKhair (the Association for the Good) was founded in 1905 by Muslim scholars of Arab heritage. Its activists were interested in the reformist ideology developed by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida (Latif 2008). 2) The Muhammadiyah was established in 1912 in Yogyakarta. Its main activities are in Islamic education, health, economics, and social charities (Alfian 1989). 3) Sarekat Islam (SI) (the Association of Islam) was the first Islamic political organization to be established in Indonesia (1911). Initially in 1905, Sarekat Islam was named SarekatDagang Islam (SDI) (the Association for Muslim Traders), and aimed to unite Javanese Muslim traders in competing against Chinese traders in Java. Later, its activists developed political interests, which led them to expand the organization's concern to politics and to change its name from SDI to SI. SI was dominated by middle class Muslims – mostly merchants with Islamic reformist agendas (Latif 2008). Interestingly, despite their economic and political concerns, they gave the organization an Islamic identity. Lastly, 4) Persis was established in 1923 by reformist Muslim scholars (Federspiel 2001). All these Islamic organizations were the 'institutions' by which those (santri) middle class Muslims expressed and disseminated their

ideas, as well as interacted or communicated with Islamic modernist scholars from Egypt and other areas (Laffan 2003).

Although there were some santri from aristocratic families who had the opportunity to study at Western (Dutch) schools in either Indonesia or the Netherlands during the early 20th Century (Latif 2008, 64), I could not see evidence of their contributions in conceptualizing modernist or neo-modernist interpretations of Islam. It is likely that, due to their poor understandings of Islamic subjects, they could not do so. To be a modernist scholar who is capable of reinterpreting Islam (like Abduh and Sayyid Ahmad Khan) requires the mastery of both Islamic knowledge and Western modernity. These aristocratic santri came from santri families and performed Islamic rituals, as santri commonly did. Regardless of their Western educational background, as Geertz (1960) and Latif (2008) note, santri tended to join Islamic organizations or Islamic parties. For this reason, most of these aristocratic santri preferred to join the Sarekat Islam, the Persis, or the Muhammadiyah. However, their numbers were few.

The priyayi (or the aristocrats) were the social class that took the most advantage of the modernization programme provided by the Dutch government in Indonesia. They received the majority of the Western education that was offered to Indonesians from the middle of the 19th Century onwards. The colonial government attempted to utilize this traditional ruling class (aristocrat) as agents for modernizing Indonesia (Benda 1958), so, for the government, the aristocrats were the most appropriate social class to be engaged in the programme.

Although most aristocrats were Muslims, majority of them were abangan, so they did not support Islamism or Islamic revivalism (Ricklefs 2007), and the majority would in fact have felt threatened by Islamic movements. During the preparation of Indonesia's independence and its constitution in 1945, these aristocrats became the proponents of the Indonesian secular state and can thus be categorized as secularist Muslims.

I argue that their different cultural capital influenced to their opposite view concerning the extent to which Islam could play its role in the state. In other words, the different way in which the aristocratic abangan and middle class santri 'interacted' with modernity caused them to conceptualize the relation between Islam and the state differently. The santri wanted to Islamize the modern nation-state, and can thus be categorized as contemporary revivalist or Islamist, whilst the abangan tended to separate Islam from the state, and can

thus be best described as secularist. This divergence encouraged a polemic on the concept of the nation-state in the years before Indonesian independence in the 20th Century. The debate between Soekarno (an aristocratic abangan) and Ahmad Hassan and Ahmad Nasir (who were santri) in the mass media during the 1920s was one example of this (see Latif 2008). Hassan and Nasir argued for the sovereignty of God being higher than the sovereignty of the people, while Soekarno argued for the opposite (Latif 2008; Assyaukanie 2009).

The santri wanted to penetrate the nation state with Islamic concepts, but were also relatively accommodative of modernity, as indicated by their support for the establishment of a modern nation-state instead of a caliphate. Nevertheless, they insisted on the modern state being Islamized. In the official meetings regarding Indonesian independence held by the Investigating Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) and the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI) during July–August 1945, the santri persistently demanded that the state be based on Islamic foundations and that it implement shari'a for all Muslims (Ismail 1995; Assyaukanie 2009). This shows that, although the santri accepted the idea of having a nation-state, they also wanted to Islamize the state by placing Islam as its foundation and applying shari'a as state law for Muslims.

Unlike the santri, the aristocratic abangan wanted a secular state that held no specific religious identity (see Esposito 2010, Lapidus 2002). Although most abangan were Muslims, they did not have any problem with being both Muslims and secularists at the same time. According to them, both the Islamic faith and its rituals are private affairs that should be separated from the state domain. This idea was expressed by Soekarno (Latif 2008; Assyaukanie 2009), who came from aristocratic abangan family and studied in the Dutch educational system. It is worth noting that his concept of a 'secular' state was not hostile towards religions per se, but one that functioned to protect people's rights to embrace and perform religious teachings and promoted a harmonious life for religious followers in Indonesia (Assyaukanie 2009). Finally, after heated debate between the proponents of sharia state and its opponents in the meeting preparing Indonesian constitution, in 18 August 1945 the PPKI agreed to build modern independent Indonesia that is neutral from any religious identity, including Islam.

Although Islamic groups accepted the new independent 'secular' state in 1945, they were still planning to fight for formalizing Sharia to be state law at the next available opportunity, and this lack of commitment to supporting

the ("secular") constitution confirmed their Islamist orientations – i.e. it confirmed their acceptance of the modern state, and their commitment to a state based on Islamic morality. They received their first opportunity to put these plans into action within the Constituent Assembly (Feith 2007, 284), which was inaugurated in 1956.

The representatives of Islamic parties again raised the 'old' issue – the implementation of shari'a within the state's sphere of responsibility and legislation. This led to a heated debate in the Assembly, with the secularists again rejecting the proposal to embed shari'a in state legislation and insisting on preserving Pancasila and keeping the state neutral with regards to religious identity. The debate in the Constituent Assembly resulted in deadlock as neither side could gain the required majority of 2/3 of the Assembly, and neither group wanted to compromise (Effendy 2003; Boland 1971). This situation was regarded as a critical one by President Soekarno, who feared that worse conflict could follow. As a result, the President issued a decree in 1959 that disbanded the Assembly and asserted UUD 1945 to be the final constitution (Feith 2007).

After this decree, the relationship between Islamic leaders (organizations) and the government (the Old Order regime) declined further, however. Most Islamic leaders were even more critical of the government, with the exception of the NU leaders, who acted pragmatically to increase their own power through building close connections with the government (Latif 2008; Effendy 2003), which led to NU leaders holding the position of Indonesia's Minister of Religion[7] from 1953. This conflict did not provoke the NU into becoming critical of the government or keeping its distance from it, and consequently the government became more trusting of NU leaders, retaining them as the exclusive leaders of the Ministry. A similar relationship was not seen between the government and Islamic revivalist (Islamist) leaders, however, with President Soekarno even accusing some prominent Masyumi leaders of being involved in a rebellion. As a result, the Masyumi was disbanded by the government in 1960, and its leaders were imprisoned until the collapse of the Soekarno regime in 1966 that came about as a result of the economic crisis, at which point the regime was replaced by the 'New Order' government (Feith 2007).

3. THE RISE OF ISLAMIC NEO-MODERNISM

The emergence of 'the New Order' (ruled 1966 to 1998) was accompanied by high expectations from many Islamic leaders, especially Islamist (revivalists)

and modernists, who hoped that the new government would be more accommodative of Islamic interests. However, it was clear that the New Order government's attitude towards Islamic movements – especially Islamic political movements – was not so different to that of the Old Order government's. Although the President allowed Muslims to be active in Islamic political parties and to form new ones, he rejected some Islamic leaders' proposals to revitalize the Masyumi, and did not allow senior figures of the Masyumi to participate in a new Islamic political party (Crouch 1981, 201). The government was suspicious that these senior Islamic leaders would still attempt to campaign for the formalization of shari'a unless they were subdued.

In addition, the government issued a regulation in 1973 that impacted negatively on both traditionalist and Islamist (revivalist Islamic) political parties. They merged all the Islamic parties, including the Parmusi and the NU party together as one, named PartaiPersatuan Pembangunan or thePPP (the United Development Party). As a result, there were then only three political parties: the PPP, the Golkar, and the PDI[8] (a blend of of nationalist, socialist, and Christian parties) (Effendy 2003, 49). It was obvious that instead of increasing the quantity of its supporters, this merger brought the party into conflicts that were related either to ideology or to power-sharing. As a result, the votes that the party received began to significantly decrease – to 27.78 percent in 1982, then to 15.97 percent in 1987 (Effendy 2003, 49). Moreover, beginning in 1973, the position of Minister of Religious Affairs – which had been exclusively occupied by the NU since 1953 – began to be given to Muslim scholars with modern educational backgrounds, including Abdul Mukti Ali[9] and MunawirSyazali.[10] This was because the regime intended to implement programmes requiring the modernization of the religious understanding of religions' adherents, particularly Muslims (see Kersten 2015, 37-38; Hefner 2002).[11] As a result, no representatives of Islamic political parties remained in the cabinet from this time on.

After weakening Indonesia's Islamic political parties, the government then attempted to dilute the Islamic ideology of Islamic mass social organizations. A regulation obligating all social and political organizations to use Pancasila as the sole foundation of their movements was issued by the government during the 1980s.

These government policies – which either directly or indirectly impacted on Islamic political parties and Islamic social organizations – led many Islamic leaders to become frustrated, and feel that the government had intentionally

marginalized Indonesian Muslims' interests. The poor relationship between Islamic leaders and the state became a major concern for some of the younger generation of santri (Islamic leaders) seeking for a way to re-conceptualize the relationship between Islam and the nation-state at the beginning of 1970s (Latif 2008). The issue of shari'a becoming state law had been raised several times (in 1945, 1957–59, and 1966-1968) by Islamic leaders, and had led to government reprisals against Muslim political organizations, so this became a vital point for these new generations to address (Effendy 2003). Although the Islamic leaders had always been defeated by the secularists, they never gave up fighting for the formalization of Shari'a within state legislation. This ongoing aim partially contributed to the development of Islamic social organizations, which were compelled to support their Islamic parties' goals unless they would be regarded as betraying Islam. However, the younger generations believed that this required the organizations to keep their distance from the government, and to keep out of economic, educational, and legal debates about the future of the nation-state (Barton 1999). In other words, they saw that Muslims, even though they made up the majority of religious adherents in the Indonesian population, could not participate significantly in the development of Indonesia.

I argue that this social and political context had shaped new cultural capital of the new generations of santri supporting them in dealing with the situation. These younger Islamic leaders were the generation that grew up in the middle of the 1960s after the collapse of the Old Order regime, as members of youth Islamic organizations such as the HMI[12] (the Islamic Student Association), the PII[13] (the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement), the IPNU[14] (the Student Association of the NU) and the PMII[15] (the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement) (Latif 2008). They included NurcholishMadjid, Djohan Effendy, Ahmad Wahib, DawamRahardjo, and Abdurrahman Wahid.[16] Among these figures, NurcholishMadjid was the most prominent young Islamic leader, and was active in expressing Islamic neo-modernist ideas during the beginning of the 1970s (Kersten 2015, 37; 2011). He studied in Islamic traditional schools (pesantren), obtained a bachelor degree from the State Islamic University (IAIN) of Jakarta in 1968, and later pursued a doctoral programme in Islamic Studies at Chicago University in the United States of America (1978–1984) (Barton 1997). This educational background contributed to his deep understanding of Islamic doctrines and modernity. In addition, Madjid was the chairman of the HMI for two periods (1966–1969 and 1969–1971), and this position as the chairman of a large Islamic student organization led him to become actively involved in public discussions. While Madjid lived in Jakarta, Djohan Effendi,

DawamRahardjo, and Ahmad Wahib were members of a limited discussion group conducted regularly in Yogyakarta between 1967 and 1971, which was supervised by Abdul Mukti Ali[17]– a Muslim scholar who had just finished his doctoral degree majoring in Islamic Studies from McGill University in Canada, and who later became Minister of Religion in 1973 (Effendy 2003, 69–70).

This group was active both through their organizations and as scholars in conducting discussions exploring the relationship between Islam and modernity, particularly in relation to the nation-state (Kersten 2015). Moreover, they participated in the public discourse on this topic in magazines, newspapers, and public discussions, and their ideas were deeply controversial with their seniors. Indeed, most of these younger leaders joined organizations that were associated with Islamic revivalist, reformist or modernist movements, with few of them coming from traditionalist Islamic organizations. I argue that the concern of these younger Islamic revivalist and reformist generations about the poor relationship between their seniors and the state was the main factor that forced them to attempt to resolve this problem. In contrast to this group, the traditionalist NU still had a working relationship with the state. Hence, its younger generations did not face the significant challenges that the younger reformist or modernist did. It is worth mentioning that Abdurrahman Wahid was one of the younger traditionalists who shared a common vision with the younger reformist leaders. Abdurrahman Wahid's father, Wahid Hasyim, was the Minister of Religion during the Old Order and, unlike his colleagues, who had been active in Indonesia during the middle of the 1960s, Abdurrahman Wahid had studied at al-Azhar in Egypt for two years, at the University of Bagdad in Iraq for several years, and at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands for several months during 1963–71 (Barton 2002, 83–101). Soon after he returned to Indonesia, he participated actively in public discourse through the mass media.

These new generations attempted to reconceptualise Islam in a way that was compatible with the nation-state. Their concern went beyond Islamic reformist or 'modernist' organizations.Its new generations endeavoured to establish an updated form of Islamic modernism, however. I refer to this new type as Islamic neo-modernism.The difference between modernism and neo-modernism is that, while the former only focuses on (Westerm) modern practical knowledge, the latter is also concerned with (Western) modern political and culture and society such as democracy, the separation of religion and state, human rights, religious pluralism, religious freedom, and multiculturalism (see Barton 1997; Rahman 1982). Their difference was caused

by different contexts; colonial for the classical modernism and post-colonial for neo-modernism. In the colonial context modernists attempted to survive from colonialism and called for modernizing their social life by adopting (Western) modern sciences. While in post-colonial era, particularly during 1970-1980s, neo-modernists endeavoured to counter Islamist or revivalist movement rising in this period contesting secular ideology of the rulers. Moreover, neo-modernist tried to convince Muslims that secular ideology is rooted in Islamic doctrines and tradition. It is noteworthy that the modernist and neo-modernist share a common view in terms of their concerns on how to reconcile Islam with modernity.

CONCLUSION

This articlediscusses about cultural capital of Indonesian Muslims and its influence to their different views on the Islam-state relationships. It reveals variety, dynamic, and 'expansion' of their cultural capital which led them to be different in dealing with the concept of the secular state. The changing social and political situation during colonial and post-colonial Indonesia portrayed in this article is important contexts that colorized the complexity and dynamic of Indonesian Muslims' cultural capital as well as their view and attitude towards the secular aspects of the state.

Indonesian Muslims' polarization in dealing with the secular state in post-colonial Indonesia cannot be separated from the role played by santri and abangan, the social groups within Indonesian Muslim societies, particularly Javanese Muslims, emerging since colonial period of Indonesia. Deep influence of previous beliefs such as Hinduism and Buddhism among Javanese Muslims led most of them to be syncretic in terms of their faith and ritual. This mean that even though they were formally Muslims, their cultural capital that had been accumulated through long process of their history made them to be more loyal to old Javanese or "local" beliefs and rituals which were deeply rooted in their religious identity. Experts call them abangan (nominal Muslims).On the other side, the expansion of cultural capital of many Javanese Muslims through conducting pilgrimage in Mecca and Medina for couple months until years had shapedmany of them to be aware about orthodox Islam.This varies cultural capitals reveal how the emergence of santri and abangan was in the middle of the 19th and early 20th Century of Indonesia, particularly in Java.

I argue that policy of the Dutch government during the colonial period providing modern education for aristocrats, who most of them were abangan,

had sharpened the gap of cultural capital between manyaristocraticabanganand santri. Aristocrats were the social class who received benefits from the Netherlands' policy for modernizing Indonesia, which provided this upper class society with privileges for obtaining modern educations in either Indonesian or Holland with the aim of developing modernity in the country. After graduating, members of the aristocracy were given positions in bureaucracy, supporting the colonial administration. This is why the aristocraticabangan were 'well-prepared' to continue managing the state when Indonesia was freed from colonialism, as they already held a conception of the modern state that was relatively secular. They grew to be secularist Muslims in modern Indonesia.

Unlike aristocraticabangan, most santri were not aristocrats, so they did not have opportunities to study in Western educational settings, only being able to access Islamic schools. The cultural capital accumulated by santri was different with the one grasped by aristocraticabangan. Even though many santri learned about modernity – particularly from Islamic modernist thinkers in Egypt, such as Abduh and Rashid Rida – what they were taught about modernity was different from the aristocraticabangan. The form of modernity developed by these Egyptian modernist thinkers had been reinterpreted and reconceptualised, so the future Indonesian Islamic leaders studying modernity in Egypt received different teachings on how to construct the nation-state.

In light of those different cultural capitals of santri and abangan, this article has explored the polarization that occurred between them in relation to the secular character of the nation-state. During the preparation of Indonesian independence in 1945, santri and aristocraticabangan transformed respectively into Islamist (contemporary revivalists) and secularists, with Islamists seeking to include shari'a in the state constitution and insisting that any President must be a Muslim, and secularists insisting that the state remain religiously neutral. This polarization had begun to occur with the first emergence of the idea of the nation-state among Indonesian leaders during the colonial period at the beginning of the 20th Century, and continued during post-colonial Indonesia (the Old Order, the New Order government, and post-New Order).

Repressive attitude that the Old Order (especially at the end of its rule) and the New Order (at the beginning of its rule) took toward Islamist or revivalist movements encouraged new generations affiliating with Islamist (modern revivalist) groups to re-conceptualize the relationship between Islam and the state. In other words, the political contexts had shaped new cultural capital of new generations of santri that could support them in dealing with

Islam and the secular state. Unlike their seniors, who fought for shari'a to be incorporated into the state's constitution and legislation, these new generations campaigned for a neo-modernist form of Islam that legitimized the secular nature of the modern state.

NOTES

1. Scholars use the term 'The Indonesian Archipelago' to refer to Indonesia and its different areas (see Ricklefs 2001; Laffan 2003; Azra 2004).

2. The Sultanate of Aceh was established in the late of Fifteenth Century. It was located in North Aceh, near to the SamuderaPasai (Ricklefs 2001; Hadi2004).

3. Demak was established in the Fifteenth Century and located on a Javanese island. The kingdom was initially part of Majapahit, which was a kingdom influenced by Hinduism and Buddhism, whose king then converted to Islam and transformed the kingdom to an Islamic one as a result (Ricklefs 2007, 179-189; Carey 2007).

4. Detailed descriptions of the concept of Javanese mysticism can be found in Ricklefs (2007, 2008).

5. The term *santri* compounds traditionalist, revivalist, and modernist positions (see Geertz 1960).

6. However, there were some *priyayi* who could be categorized as *santri* because they were devout Muslims with Islamic educational backgrounds. In addition, some of the later generation of *priyayi* would become prominent activists of Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam (Latif 2008, 64).

7. The Ministry of Religion was established in 1946. The Ministry was under the control of Masyumi figures from the time of its creation, although these figures originally came from the NU, Muhammadiyah, and Sarekat Islam. In 1952 the NU separated from Masyumi and created its own political party, using this to build a close relationship with the government and, as a result, President Soekarno gave the Ministry of Religion to the NU from 1953 until the collapse of his power in 1966 (Latif 2008, 280–285).

8. The PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party) was mainly made up of former supporters of President Soekarno, most of whom were secularist Muslims, *abangan*, and members of lower class society, whilst a small number were Christians and socialists (Vatikiotis 1993; Ricklefs 2012).

9. Abdul Mukti Ali became the Minister of Religious Affairs during 1973–1978. He is a Muslim scholar who obtained his doctoral degree majoring in Islamic Studies from McGill University in Canada in 1970s. His organizational background is as a member of the HMI – the youth wing of the Masyumi(revivalist party) (Assyaukanie 2009; Latif 2008).

10. Munawir Syazali was the Minister of Religious Affairs during 1983–1993 (two periods). He graduated with a Masters in Politics from George Town University, USA. He was an activist of GPII (an Islamic youth organization with a revivalist orientation) (Latif 2008).

11. From 1978–1983, the Ministry was run by an individual with a military background – RatuAlamsyahPrawiranegara.

12. The HMI was established in 1947 by Muslim university students. Its activists had close relationships with Masyumi leaders (Latif 2008).

13. The PII was established in 1947. The organization was provided for school students. Its activists had close relationships with Masyumi leaders (Latif 2008).

14. The IPNU was established in 1954, and provided for school students who affiliated with the NU (Latif 2008).

15. The PMII was established in 1960, and provided for university students who affiliated with the NU (Latif 2008).

16. Abdurrahman Wahid was the Chairman of the NU (an Islamic traditionalist organization established in 1926) from 1984–1999, and President of Indonesia from 1999–2001.

17. During his time in the position of Minister of Religion, Mukti Ali played an important role in encouraging State Islamic Institutes (IAIN) – Islamic higher education institutions maintained by the government – to reform their curriculum in order to support substanstialistic thinking about Islam (Kersten 2015). This form of thinking involves "a reinterpretation [of Islam] focussing on the substance of Islamic teachings rather than its formal aspects" (Kersten 2015, 37). Harun Nasution (1919–1998) – Mukti Ali's colleague, who also graduated from McGill University-Canada – was the most prominent Rector of IAIN-Jakarta during the 1970s, and was central in initiating the reform of the curriculum (see Kersten 2015).

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